Mr. Chairman, thank you and members of the committee

for providing the opportunity to comment on potential postconflict

reconstruction efforts in the wake of a U.S.-Iraqi conflict.

While I’m co-directing a project concerned with this issue, jointly

conducted by the Association of the U.S. Army and the Center for

Strategic and International Studies, the views expressed here are

my own and do not necessarily reflect the views of the parent organizations

or my colleagues or our commission, which has several

Members of Congress on it.

I have a statement for the record, sir, and I’d like to make a few

brief comments.

Thank you, sir.

Any post-conflict reconstruction effort taken in the wake of an

American-led conflict with Iraq will require broad international

support, significant human and material resources, and an unwavering

political commitment over time. As you’ve heard, the United

States has a number of national interests at stake in Iraq that

would require significant and sustained involvement.

First and foremost, the United States must make certain that

Iraq no longer poses a threat to its neighbors or the world. We cannot

tolerate weapons of mass destruction possessed by a regime

that operates outside the bounds of civilized behavior.

Second, the United States must prove its commitment to securing

peace in the region. Iran’s perceptions of U.S. objectives and

the reactions to having U.S. forces engaged within both Iran’s eastern

and western neighbors must be seriously considered.

And, third, the Iraq that follows a conflict must be both viable

and capable of self-determined behavior in consonance with generally

accepted norms of international and domestic order. It must

neither be a basket case nor a bully.

I think the international community will hold the United States

primarily responsible for the outcome in the post-conflict reconstruction

effort, but we can expect significant international involvement

in any post-conflict situation in Iraq. Due to the vacuum expected

to exist at the end of an Iraqi war, the notable centrifugal

tendencies in several regions of the country and the significant economic

potential which may be realized in the successful reconstruction

of the country, the coordination of international actors is extraordinarily

important. The international community should begin

now to implement planning mechanisms and align tasks, actors,

and resources to accomplish this effort. The key tasks should be

clearly delegated to various actors based on their relative comparative

advantages. I note that we began to discuss the situation in

Germany and what it would like after the end of World War II beginning

as early as 1942.

The United States needs a strategy for Iraq that integrates postconflict

reconstruction efforts with the political and military campaign

to accomplish regime change. U.S. planning efforts should

avoid the false dichotomy of conflict and post-conflict operations,

and our strategy and operational plans must define a seamless progression

of tasks, responsible actors, and the resources applied to

those tasks that accomplish the national objective. The planning for

post-conflict reconstruction must commence now rather than after

hostilities have commenced or, worse, ended.

I think Iraq will need international support in four major areas—

security, governance and participation, justice and reconciliation,

and social and economic well-being. I’d like to provide a little bit

more detail on the security requirements.

First, there are indications, which are arguable, that removal of

the current security forces and apparatus without significant capabilities

to immediately replace them may result in reprisal and retribution

killings in Baghdad and other large cities. Public order

and the protection of the populace and the humanitarian relief effort

is paramount in this regard.

A second important aspect of security will be obtaining guarantees

from the neighboring states to refrain from trying to control

or unduly influence events in Iraq. This leads to a requirement

that the Shatt al-Arab and the Iraqi oil fields must be protected.

Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts will demand

special attention. With the Iraqi forces, including their reserves,

equaling about 700,000 personnel and another 60,000 in the

various security services, disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

efforts will dwarf anything that we have previously attempted.

Iraqi’s large and organizationally diverse security forces

will require integration into organizations that are visible, transparent,

and responsive to a legitimate government.

And, finally, and one of the most important tasks, control of the

weapons of mass destruction and their facilities associated with

production and storage must be a top priority.

I would propose the following security force, and I posit this in,

U.S. force equivalents, because I think that we will be the ‘‘lead

dog in this pen,’’ Mr. Chairman, and I think that if we get coalition

partners to add to this effort, that is additional capacity that may

allow us to leave or reduce our presence at an earlier rate, but I

don’t know that it’s a substitute for a core American presence in

the country.

The requirements are: providing the core security for the largest

cities, about 10 million in population in the largest eight, which is

about 40 percent of the total population, and the humanitarian effort;

securing the WMD and their associated facilities; patrolling

the Iranian border areas and the Kurdish areas; protecting the

Shatt al-Arab and the oil fields; monitoring the regions of the Tigris,

the Euphrates, and the Syrian border; the Tigris and Euphrates

contain the bulk of the population; and then conducting an integrated

disarmament and demobilization process that is coordinated

with the reintegration efforts.

You’ve heard my colleague, just previously, talk about the economy;

releasing some several hundred thousand people back into the

economy as a result of a demobilization effort it has to be integrated

well with efforts to provide employment and useful things

for idle hands to do; and, last, a reform of the security sector.

These missions place a premium on intelligence, mobility, maneuverability,

and boots on the ground, quite honestly. And, therefore,

I would propose a post-conflict security force of about 75,000

personnel. This does not, as I said, count coalition contributions,

and I would also point out that for many of the things that are

called for in this type of a situation, the United States may be the

only provider of that capability.

I would organize this, and this is a notional sort of force list,

with a corps headquarters—and I think that the entire force has

to have a significant aviation capability so that you can retain your

mobility and with a small number of soldiers—make your presence

felt around the country using a mobility advantage—a corps headquarters,

two U.S. divisions, one of which I think should be the

101st Airborne Division because of its aviation capability.

The second division is situation-dependent as to whether the

neighbors, especially Iran, are—how their behavior is evaluated. If

the evaluation of their behavior and their attitude toward what

we’re doing is relatively complacent, then I think a light division

with more infantry to use within Iraq is probably appropriate. If,

on the other hand, the Iranians are threatening or there is a problem

with the brigade of the Iraqi Diaspora that’s coming back into

the country, then perhaps an armor division or a mechanized division

would be more appropriate to help secure Iraq’s eastern border.

Two U.S. calvary regiments. They have a significant aviation capability,

and they’re organized, trained, and equipped specifically

for a role that would allow them to do border surveillance and patrolling

in certain areas.

A corps aviation brigade—once again, to plus-up the aviation. I

think a special operations forces group, an SF group, would be required

initially for securing their weapons of mass destruction, and

then they could transition into what they’re also very, very good at,

which is security sector reform and training of a new Iraqi military.

A corps Support Command for logistical support, an additional

engineer brigade to help work on the infrastructure, and then 4,000

police monitors. The standard that has been used ever since the

end of World War II and is adopted by the UNDP is about one policeman

for every 450 to 500 citizens. And then the standard that

we’ve arrived at in the Balkans is that you have about one monitor

for every ten policemen in order to achieve round-the-clock monitoring

capability. And so that winds up being about 4,000 international

police monitors, and I would strongly recommend that

those come from the moderate Arab states and those along the

North African littoral that we might be able to encourage to participate

in this.

There will be a requirement for some limited U.S. Air Force tactical

air lift, but I think that that can—a lot of that can be based

in Turkey, Kuwait, and perhaps some of our other partners as time

goes on and we reduce our presence within Iraq.

The total cost of this force—once again, based in U.S. equivalents,

and there’s wide variation in counting—could range up to

about $16 billion for that first year for a force of 75,000 to operate

within Iraq.

And, last, the duration of that force. I think that in the past, we

have probably been a little bit overly optimistic. I think that force

would have to stay within Iraq performing its functions for approximately

a year. As Professor Marr pointed out, a national constituting

process that could take place within 6 months and that was

legitimate might reduce some of that requirement, and we might

be able to begin drawing that force down a little bit earlier. But

I would see a significant force, one above the level of 5,000 people,

with some sort of reduction in that force going on, but I would see

a significant force of about 5,000 people remaining in Iraq for a

good 5 to 6 years.

We would try to reduce that presence consonant with the

progress in developing Iraq’s legitimate security sector and also

with progress in the other four areas of reconstruction—or the

other three areas of reconstruction, which are economic and social

well-being, justice and reconciliation, and governance and participation.

I have included in my statement, for the record, some policy recommendations

that we’ve made for those three areas, but I’ve made

it to the bell, and so, sir, I will now be happy to answer any questions.

Thank you.

From my knowledge of the planning processes—

and, sir, I’ve got to say, you know, once you retire, your access

seems to go up, but your credibility may be suspect, because you

get farther and farther away from things and get staff. I would

have to believe, knowing my colleagues in the military, that people

are taking a look at this effort. I cannot say, with any reason to

be confident at all, that they would necessarily come up with the

same number that I did.

The formal planning process does call for an annex

to a contingency plan to have a post-conflict sequence of events and

resources and tasks, et cetera. So I would have to assume that in

the generation of the plan for whatever options are out there, that

each one of those options would contain an annex that would have

this type of analysis in it.

If I may, sir, I don’t have any particular knowledge

on the level of the humanitarian crisis that exists, but clearly the

one that’s ongoing now is obviously a baseline. And then, of course,

the creation, as the doctor pointed out, of any additional humanitarian

requirements based on the type of campaign that is conducted

clearly is a consideration.

I would go back to something that the chairman also said, and

Senator Lugar, and the idea of trying to find out exactly what all

the ramifications are and the fact that there’s a post-conflict reconstruction

annex, or a similar document, that’s appended to military

plan. We are currently—or the military is currently conducting

some exercises and simulations down at Joint Forces Command,

the Millenium Challenge exercise, which is trying to come to grips

with a better process of integrating both the military and the interagency

processes. And I would argue that more needs to be done

in that area.

So, as an example, you could run a military simulation of a campaign,

and then not let anybody leave the room—put them all on

a bus, take them down to the Institute for Defense Analysis and

run a simulation that they have down there called SENSE, which

is Synthetic Environment for National Security Estimates. That

particular game is something that we have run in the Balkans and

in some of the former Soviet republics to bring people back and

show them how market economy with all its ramifications, works,

so that if you do something to try to reduce unemployment, it

causes a repercussion in another area that you have to balance out.

Linking all the disparate parts and all the capacity that we have

in our government together is really the key to getting a handle on

the cost and bringing together people who can integrate those efforts

so that those unforseen circumstances are acknowledged and

accounted for in the plan.

I noticed that the amendment that was proposed today about

doing an assessment in Afghanistan—looking at the transportation

system—clearly a combination of what damage existed before, what

damage we did during the campaign. Our assessment could have

been done earlier. We would have a better handle on what the cost

of that is. The idea of bringing together all the disparate players

to address this—the entire issue of a conflict and what comes after

in an integrated, coherent fashion, I think would yield some answers.

And the day after, as opposed to 6 weeks—or 6 months for a constituent

assembly and some of the security force implementation

that would take place in weeks, I think that a lot of those things

could begin on the ground immediately if civilian agencies, both

from the U.S. Government and our NGO and international partners,

had planning development capacity similar to the military.

My experience in the military—there are 23,000 people in the

Pentagon. That’s what those guys do all day. They plan. There are

no parallel organizations—only small little sections that are way

overburdened—in many of the other significant Cabinet agencies

that have a responsibility to bring the resources to bear and integrate

their stuff with the military. And so, therefore, the military,

which has standing capacity and a great ability to plan, moves in,

attempts to do the right thing, often does very well, fills the vacuum,

and then has to be, you know, massaged and part of that filling

of the vacuum is why there’s a perception that the military

doesn’t like to do these things, because they feel they get sucked

into those sorts of things.

And, once again, the costs that I listed, and the

number of troops, clearly with the ability to deploy police monitors,

et cetera, et cetera, you could change the slope of your withdrawal

if civilian agencies were prepared to pick up the execution of those

tasks.

I hesitate to—the committee heard from other witnesses

that are probably better qualified than I am to speak to that

specific eventuality, Senator. I would say that you’ve got a range.

And so I think part—of possible outcomes—part of the initial campaign,

and probably—and I have no prior knowledge of this, but

thinking logically, as you point out—clearly, one of our first efforts

has got to be to get a handle on all that stuff and all those people,

and then that cannot be allowed to sort of slip away into the general

population of Iraq.

It is—in microcosm, much more important task—it has to be a

very tightly focused effort to do that, the same as we would not

allow some of the general officers and some of the other leaders

from some of the clans and the military to just sort of—go through

the demobilization line and then be released into the general populace.

But I think that’s got to be a top priority in our plan.

Colonel FEIL Yes, sir.

Sir, I guess, speaking—as I think I said at the beginning—

sort of the benchmark—first of all, referring to the nation

building, as my colleagues have pointed out, Iraq is a nation, so it

is a qualitatively different problem than Afghanistan or putting together

a Bosnia, that sort of thing. The——

There was a German nation there. It——

No, sir. I——

I would not consider that nation building. I considered that——

A defeat in a conventional war and a

reconstruction of the civil administration, the governing processes,

and the security sector and the economy, clearly through the Marshall Plan.

Absolutely, because there is wide variation. And

each—although we try to draw some generalizations, each case has

its own very significant sort of gradations.

I think that, unfortunately, what we’ve done in the decade of the

1990s a lot of times is try to look for the 50th percentile, plus one,

and just nudge a process over the edge. And what we’ve wound up

doing—I hate to say it—is, I think, in some instances, is low-balling

that effort. And then you’re in the problem of we can’t put more

in, because we had a bad experience with that in the 1960s in Vietnam.

And so, therefore, we hope and we try to cobble together and

patch something that will get us farther on down the road where

we know, I think—at least I feel—in the depths of our gut, if we

had gone in there hard—or large, I guess—Secretary Perry’s statement

when we went into Bosnia, ‘‘We’re going in as the lead dog.

We’re the toughest guys on the block. Don’t mess around with us.’’

We got a response—the response that we wanted at that time.

I think that applying that kind of logic in post-conflict reconstruction,

has some compelling aspects to it—it looks bad at the

outset, but if you can demonstrate—if you went in with—if you

took my figures and went in with 75,000 and you had a Bonn-like

process and a Tokyo-like process and got the national constituting

process together and got the donors together and figured out who’s

going to do what to whom, and are we all at the start line appropriately,

based on our comparative advantage, when the thing tumbles,

then that slope would be very steep—you know, if you’re there

for 6 months, and then all of a sudden you say, ‘‘Look, I came in

with 75,000 guys—or I came in with whatever the campaign called

for, and because the civilian agencies were with them, I withdrew

down to 75,000, and then 3 months later I’m pulling out 10,000

guys, and 3 months after that I’m pulling out 10,000 guys.’’ If you

can demonstrate progress, I think that may allay some of the fears

my colleagues have stated and the concerns that the regional nations

might have.

I think absolutely.